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ABSTRACT
The beef industryin theUnited Statesconsists of severaldistinctproduction levels ranging
from the cow-calf producer at the lowest level to the final consumer. These sectors face
varying levels of profitability,degrees of marketpower, conflicting goals, andprice signals.
Environmentalregulations involve questions of what costs are involved, who is in a po-
sition to pay these costs, and whether market prices are capable of signaling different
environmental practices. Understanding the relationships within the beef industry may
allow researchersto fine-tune analyses of environmentalissues in the beef industry,
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The beef industry in the United States consists
of several distinct production levels ranging
from the cow-calf producer at the lowest level
to the final consumer. Each of these levels has
varying degrees of market power. The degree
of market power has a substantial influence on
the ability or, in some cases, the inability of
the players in the different production levels
to adopt and use alternative production man-
agement practices. Simply put, some produc-
ers may not be in a sound enough financial
position to adopt alternative management
practices, or the market price does not clearly
signal the desires of players at the higher pro-
duction levels. While the title of this paper
indicates that fed beef will be the focus, the
authors have chosen to broaden the discussion
to the entire beef production sector. This paper
will focus on the relationships between market
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power and price signals and the incentives or
disincentives that are created for environmen-
tal stewardship for cow-calf producers, back-
grounding or stocker operations, and feedlots.
Several types of pollution are caused by
agriculture (e.g., water, air, etc.). For simplic-
ity, this discussion will focus on water pollu-
tion. Agriculture is the leading source of water
pollution in the United States [National Re-
search Council (NRC); U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) 1993]. In re-
cent years, animal agriculture has been target-
ed as a major source of pollution of rivers,
lakes, and aquifers (U.S. EPA 1992). For ex-
ample, animal agriculture is responsible for
1370 of the impairments to rivers; this figure
is higher than impairments from either indus-
trial sources or storm sewers, at 9% and 11Yo,
respectively (U.S. EPA 1993).
Livestock pollution has generally been
controlled by utilizing appropriate best man-
agement practices (BMPs). Both unconfined
or range/pasture management representative of
cow-calf and stocker operations, and confined38 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
management representative of feedlots utilize
alternative BMPs to control water pollution
(Sweeten and Melvin). The levels of manage-
ment and costs associated with these BMPs
are considerably different for unconfined and
confined operations. Feedlots have far greater
potential to cause water quality problems than
pasture operations, unless properly designed
water pollution abatement systems are in-
stalled (Sweeten). This stems from the sheer
numbers of animals that are confined in rela-
tively small areas.
The remainder of this paper offers a dis-
cussion of environmental regulations and costs
for livestock operations, the structure of the
cattle industry, and cattle production and pric-
ing issues, and the relationships within these
issues are summarized. The interaction be-
tween market and environmental issues may
suggest some future methodological adjust-
ments in environmental research.
Environmental Regulations and Costs
Associated with Confined and Unconfined
Operations
Under the 1972 Clean Water Act, feedlots with
greater than 1,000 head are designated point
sources of pollution and are required to man-
age manure in accord with a National Pollu-
tion Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit (Outlaw et al.). This designation results
in significant costs and levels of management
required to maintain the permit. Every per-
mitted operation must have a pollution pre-
vention plan that includes a retention facility
or basin designed to capture and hold all con-
taminated runoff and process water for a min-
imum of 21 days, a waste management plan,
an erosion control plan, an employee training
plan, a regular inspection program, and a rec-
ord keeping system. In addition, any existing
retention facility must be certified by a pro-
fessional engineer or ground water scientist to
have no hydrologic connection to nearby wa-
terways (Smolen and Caldwell).
Feedlots with fewer than 1,000 head are
designated as nonpoint sources of pollution
(Outlaw et al.). In general, the waste manage-
ment options available to this type operation
are less costly and management intensive. As
reported by Sweeten and Melvin, BMPs that






Locating the feeding facility away from a
stream or drainage channel.
Diverting outside runoff away from the
feedlot surface by using diversion terraces
and roof gutters.
Collecting solids carried off the feedlot sur-
face by runoff water.
Installing a grass filter strip at least twice as
large as the feedlot where the feedlot is close
to a water body.
Installing a runoff holding pond if the water
quality risk is high.
Unconfined cattle production is also treated
as a nonpoint source of pollution. This type of
production accounts for one-half of the almost
109 million metric tons of animal manure gen-
erated each year in the United States (Sweeten
and Melvin). In unconfined livestock opera-
tions, manure and sediment runoff can be sig-
nificant particularly where livestock are free to
trample and defecate in and along streams and
ponds (U.S. EPA 1992). BMPs that help con-





Installing electric wire fences along streams
and providing environmentally sound stream
crossings.
Rotating cattle among several smaller-sized
loafing areas to allow vegetative cover to re-
generate.
Providing adequate storage for manure sup-
plies.
Applying manure nutrients to land only as
needed by crops (U.S. EPA 1992).
Animal numbers, dispersion, and location
have a significant influence on the costs of en-
vironmental compliance for confined and un-
confined cattle operations. The question be-
comes more complex—i.e., not only what
costs are to be borne, but also, who is in the
best position to pay the costs and are prices
capable of signaling the need for better envi-
ronmental management? To answer these que-Outlaw, Anderson, and Padberg: Beef Market Signals and Production 39
ries, it is helpful to understand more about the
beef production system.
The Beef Production System
Perhaps the best way to begin discussion of
the interplay between the beef industry and the
environment is to define and discuss in general
terms the different sectors of the industry and
their relation to each other.
The basic beef production unit is the cow-
calf operation. The operation has a cow herd
and calves are produced. Although calves may
be sold at any time, it is generally done after
weaning. Depending on the area of the coun-
try, calves may weigh between 450 and 650
pounds at sale. From the cow-calf operation,
calves may go to stocker/backgrounding op-
erations, or directly into feedlots. Of course,
the cow-calf operator may retain ownership of
the calves or sell them to others.
Backgrounding or stocker operations may
be thought of as including rye grass winter
pastures in the Southeast, wheat pasture in the
Southern Plains, and other backgrounding pro-
grams in the West, Midwest, and Northern
Plains. In these operations, calves are over-
wintered on a feed source to be sold at heavier
weights in the spring. In some areas, these
“feeders” may be held into the summer to
take advantage of additional spring and sum-
mer grasses. In these cases, the feeders are
then sold, off grass, as yearlings.
Feeder cattle and/or calves then move into
feedlots. The feedlot sector involves drylot,
concentrate (grain) feeding of steers and heif-
ers to slaughter weight. For all practical pur-
poses, all steers and heifers are fed in the Unit-
ed States. The only nonfed components of
beef production are cull cows and bulls. The
length of feeding period will vary due to the
weather and the type of cattle, but predomi-
nant y the feeding period will be from 100 to
240 days.
Beyond the cattle production sectors are
the packers and the wholesale and retail mar-
kets. Packers purchase fed animals to slaugh-
ter and process and sell beef in the wholesale
market. Grocery stores and hotel, restaurant,
and institutional (HRI) buyers purchase beef
for sale to consumers in the retail market.
Production and Pricing Issues
There are many important cattle price and
pricing issues that may play a role in the in-
dustry’s ability to practice sound environmen-
tal stewardship. Among these are cattle prices
and the cattle cycle, competing goals and price
signals of each sector of the industry, and sev-
eral market concentration issues. While this is
not an all-inclusive list, it does provide a start-
ing place for identifying important issues re-
lating to environmental quality and the beef
industry.
The Cattle Cycle
The history of the cattle industry has been one
of cycles as cow-calf producers expand inven-
tories in response to profits and, ultimately,
contract their herd size in response to losses.
While no two cattle inventory cycles have
been exactly the same, there have been a num-
ber of repetitive patterns occurring across cy-
cles which can be used to judge where the
industry is and where it is headed within a
given cattle cycle (Anderson, Robb, and Min-
tert).
Cycles are measured from one trough to
the next trough. The average length of the six
full cycles in cattle inventories since 1928 has
been about 10 years. On average, inventories
increased about six years during each cycle;
during the last full cycle, however, cattle in-
ventories increased just three years before pro-
ducers began to liquidate their herds. Histori-
cally, periods of declining cattle inventories
have averaged about four years. Liquidation
during the 1980s was a dramatic exception;
lasting eight years, this was the longest liqui-
dation phase on record. The cattle herd liqui-
dation of the 1980s was apparently caused by
an extended period of low prices attributable
not only to cattle and beef supplies, but also
to large year-to-year declines in beef demand.
Relatively low prices of competing meats, and
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Figure 1. U.S. cattle inventory and Amarillo 500–600 pound steer prices, 1970-96
tastes and preferences for beef, led to the de-
cline in beef demand.
Prior to 1979, the long-term trend in the
U.S. cattle sector was for inventories to in-
crease. At each cycle’s trough, the cattle and
calves inventory was larger than the lowest
inventory during the previous cycle, and each
successive inventory peak was greater than the
previous cycle’s peak. The cattle inventory
peak during the 1979–90 cycle was the first
time the cycle’s peak failed to establish a rec-
ord high. In addition, the 1990 cattle inventory
estimate marked the first time an inventory
trough fell below the previous cycle’s trough.
Cattle cycles occur in large part because of
the biological nature of production. Cow-calf
producers respond to profitable calf prices by
holding back more replacement heifers and
not culling as many cows. The increase in cow
numbers leads to more calves for the next
year. But additional heifers held back for entry
in the cow herd won’t increase beef produc-
tion for at least three years. Eventually, the
increase in the cattle inventory, and subse-
quently beef supplies, leads to lower prices.
Ultimately, prices decline below many cow-
calf producers’ break-even level, prompting
higher-cost firms to start liquidating their
herds. Herd liquidation continues until prices
return to profitable levels.
The amount of time it takes production to
respond to higher or lower prices creates a lag
between price peaks (troughs) and subsequent
inventory peaks (troughs). For example, an-
nual average prices for 500–600 pound steers
in western Kansas reached a cycle high of
$87.97 per cwt in 1979, but the cattle and
calves inventory didn’t peak until three years
later in 1982 (figure 1). Similarly, in the cur-
rent cycle, the same weight steers averaged
$100.19 per cwt in 1991, and it appears the
cattle and calves inventory peaked about five
years later.
In summary, profitability in the cattle in-
dustry is heavily influenced by the stage of
cattle cycle. Some understanding of the cycle
itself and where the industry currently is in the
cycle should add insight into the ability of the
industry to adopt and practice production
management techniques that are thought to be
good environmental stewardship.
Competing Goals and Price Signals
Each sector of the industry has a different set
of goals, i.e., different cattle characteristics are
paid for and valued in the market by each seg-
ment of the industry. These competing values
can cloud price signals and potentially confuse
market signals related to environmental qual-
ity.
The cow-calf producer is paid on the
pounds of calves produced. The most impor-
tant factor in ranch profit is producing andOutlaw, Anderson, and Padberg: Beef Market Signals and Production 41
selling a live calf (Melton, Colette, and Will-
ham). For example, one more 500-pound steer
calf to sell at $80 per cwt represents an addi-
tional $400 to the producer. A short list of oth-
er important factors would include weaning
weight, birth weight, cow milk production,
and calving ease,
The stocker-backgrounder has a different
set of goals. Characteristics of the mother cow
have much less significance, while rate of
weight gain and feed conversion rates increase
in importance. At sale, some characteristics
will command a premium (or at least a smaller
discount), including the number of head sold
at the same time, breed type, and (related to
breed) the color of the animal. Note that some
of these premium characteristics also apply to
calves being sold.
Cattle feeders may consider fed cattle pric-
es, feed costs, and feed conversion and rate of
gain in the decision to purchase feeder cattle.
In addition, pens of cattle expected to have
more Choice grade animals may attract higher
prices. Packers pay an average price for cat-
tle—the same price is paid for both good and
bad cattle in a pen. In an attempt to solve this
problem, there is a move toward more value-
based marketing in the form of pricing grids.
With pricing grids, there is a schedule of pre-
miums and discounts for quality characteris-
tics. The result should be more quality-based
market information to producers.
Finally, throw into this mix of competing
goals, values, and price signals some charac-
teristics identified as being important to con-
sumers. In particulw, price, flavor, tenderness,
and juiciness have been identified as being of
importance to consumers.
Pricing Issues
The sharp decline in cattle and calf prices in
1994–96 brought to the forefront an ongoing
debate about pricing in the cattle industry.
Among those pricing issues are packer con-
centration (market power), captive supplies,
market price determination, and the differen-
tiation of consumer food products and retail
price behavior. There is a large body of liter-
ature on these issues, and this discussion is not
meant to be comprehensive. The following is
intended to briefly introduce some of the is-
sues involved. While it is a favorite theme of
classic economics that prices direct all of the
activities from producer to consumer, in real-
ity, there are many influences which tend to
complicate and confuse price information.
The belief appears to be widespread among
producers that concentration in the beef pack-
ing sector has allowed packers to exercise
market power to hold down cattle prices. In
1980, the four-firm concentration in the beef
packing sector represented 36% of steer and
heifer slaughter, increasing to 82% by 1994
[U.S. Department of Agriculture/Agricultural
Marketing Service (USDA/AMS) 1996b]. The
impacts of market concentration generally
have been difficult to identify. Studies have
indicated that packers have been able to ex-
ercise a small degree of market power (Ward
and Schroeder). But concentration has also led
to increased plant and industry efficiency that
may allow packers to bid more for cattle than
they could otherwise.
Captive supplies are cattle committed to
buyers more than two weeks in advance. Cap-
tive supply arrangements may include forward
contracts and packer feeding. The concern is
over the impact of captive supplies on the cash
market price of cattle. On one hand, a packer
having locked-up cattle supplies may bid less
aggressively in the cash market, potentially re-
ducing cash prices. On the other hand, fewer
cattle on the cash market may also mean high-
er cash prices as packers without captive sup-
plies bid for the reduced number of cattle
available. Research has shown that in some
cases, captive supplies have a small negative
impact on cash cattle prices (Ward et al.).
The concern over these marketing issues
grew to such a high level that the USDA
formed the Advisory Committee on Agricul-
tural Concentration. The committee reviewed
information and research, and heard comments
from the public on a wide range of issues.
Three general recommendations of the com-
mittee are briefly summarized as follows
(USD+VAMS 1996a):
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under the Packer and Stockyards Act should
be stepped up.
l The degree of price and quantity reporting
and information timeliness in all livestock
sectors should be increased.
l The amount of information available to all
parties in the vertically integrated food in-
dustry needs to be increased.
Product differentiation—the development
of product brands which are important to con-
sumer choice—is an important factor in food
marketing. This type of marketing activity is
developed to a much greater extent in food
than in most consumer products. It puts em-
phasis on the development of new and differ-
ent product attributes, rather than emphasizing
traditional product values. This activity also
invites the introduction of private-label prod-
ucts by food retailing firms, with frequently as
much as a 30% price discount, It is not known
how much this “battle of the brands” affects
the system’s ability to transmit accurate infor-
mation from consumer to producer with pric-
es.
Food retailers are very sensitive to retail
prices of their competitors. It is argued that
they are more sensitive to “horizontal com-
petition” than to “vertical competition” (Pad-
berg, Knutson, and Jafri). If retailers are pric-
ing 20,000 to 30,000 items, it may not be
feasible or important for them to be sensitive
to all of the vertical relationships (which trans-
mit price information). Clearly it is important
to their survival to pay attention to prices of
other stores. This emphasis may reduce the
ability of the food system to accurately trans-
mit price information.
In summary, there are a host of issues of
concern in today’s cattle market. The cattle cy-
cle, and the nature of cattle production in gen-
eral, is an important indicator of profitability.
The competing goals of each sector of the in-
dustry also may cloud price signals between
sectors. The general areas of market power, as
shown in the packers and stockyards concen-
tration studies and the USDA concentration
committee report, also indicate a significant
level of distrust between producers and other
industry segments. Since each affects the prof-
itability of the sector, they consequently affect
the ability to pay for environmental practices.
Getting the Right Signal
In some respects, the relationship between
market price signals and production manage-
ment in the cattle industry is fairly straight-
forward. Take, for example, consumers’ desire
for leaner beef. This message is communicated
through retail demand to packers who, in turn,
bid the price of fed cattle that are not over-
finished to a relative premium compared to
over-finished cattle. Cattle feeders then may
pay a premium for the type (size and/or
breeds) of feeder cattle that produce leaner
meat or finish cattle to Select instead of
Choice grade. Hopefully, then, this informa-
tion may be passed on to producers in the
form of premiums (discounts) for calves of the
desired (undesired) breed. Producers can then
react to this price signal by purchasing breed-
ing stock of the desired breed. This example,
although fairly simple, serves to illustrate how
the demand for measurable or distinguishable
traits may be signaled throughout the produc-
tion system.
It is also clear from the previous discussion
on the cattle cycle that players in this industry
are geared toward reacting to price signals.
Due to the biological nature of beef produc-
tion, it takes time for management changes to
correct the market imbalance, but producers
do respond rather quickly by either liquidating
or expanding their herds.
Consider a cow-calf producer who adopts
the BMP of fencing off his cattle from direct
access to a nearby stream. It is fairly clear that
the amount of market power or influence the
various players have declines significantly
from packer to cow-calf producer. This pro-
ducer does not have the ability to pass on the
costs associated with this BMP, and therefore
must internalize these costs. Not all the players
face this same dilemma. As market power in-
creases, so does the ability to pass on costs
associated with waste management—which is
fortunate, because the costs associated with
BMPs increase with the movement from cow-
calf producer to the feedlots.Outlaw, Anderson, and Padberg: Beef Market Signals and Production 43
As Thurow and Holt aptly pointed out in
the previous paper, firms may be able to “im-
prove their efficiency through adopting cost-
saving or quality-improving technologies”
[emphasis added]. Fencing cattle out of ripar-
ian areas neither improves nor degrades the
quality of beef produced. Accordingly, there
would not be a cattle price premium due to
enhanced beef quality.
The Green Beef Example
Now take the case of consumers preferring
beef that was produced under a production
management regime that incIuded sound en-
vironmental stewardship utilizing the appro-
priate BMPs. There is almost no way to de-
termine whether the animals (e.g., fed and
feeder cattle, stockers, and/or calves) were
produced under this type of management be-
cause there is no identifiable trait or charac-
teristic that distinguishes the production sys-
tem under which the animal was raised. This
is not just a hypothetical situation, There are
studies which show that consumers are willing
to pay for environmental protection (Carson
and Mitchell). But how would consumers
know they were getting what they paid for?
On the other hand, there are also studies re-
porting that cattle producers think they are do-
ing a good job as stewards of the land (Smith),
If so, are they being rewarded by the market?
Thus fm, our experience with environmen-
tal quality problems has shown that it is far
easier to have the government create legisla-
tion to “attempt” to handle a problem than to
wait for markets to solve it. There have been
surveys of the general public that indicate a
majority have preferences for environmental
improvement in agriculture, and expect more
regulation of the sector rather than less
(USDA/Natural Resources Conservation Ser-
vice 1995). However, the current political
trends favor increased reliance on private
stewardship directed by market signals (Ervin
and Graffy).
Will market signals do the job of directing
producers toward sound environmental pro-
duction practices? The answer is probably
no—because of differences in what the market
values. The market has not assigned a value
to environmentally sound management of an-
imal wastes (Manale and Narrod). The pollu-
tion caused by these farms is generally treated
as an externality (Ervin and Graffy; Manale
and Narrod), which means that the cost asso-
ciated with pollution is borne by someone oth-
er than the person who caused it to arise (Port-
ney).
There is an example (and probably count-
less others) of market price signals that are
changing beef production practices toward dif-
ferent environmental stewardship. The fly fish-
ing boom and the dollars spent for quality fly
fishing opportunities on private land adjacent
to rivers and streams may enable some pro-
ducers to pay for management changes. Hunt-
ing and fishing leases, and even bird watching
activities, may provide additional income for
producers in the right location and who can
manage accordingly. But it is important to rec-
ognize that producers are responding to “en-
vironmental” market price signals rather than
to cattle or beef market price signals.
Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to identify
and address the relationship between market
price signals and production management in
the beef production sector. It is clear that mar-
ket price signals work, and work well for traits
that are distinguishable. Also, the ups and
downs of the cattle cycle have been signaling
production management changes to producers
throughout the cattle industry’s history. A
problem arises when animals raised under one
production management practice are indistin-
guishable from animals raised under more pre-
ferred alternative practices. This is the case for
cattle produced utilizing the appropriate BMPs
to control environmental pollution. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to tell the difference.
There are several issues at work in today’s
beef industry including profitability, market
power in different production sectors, and
market signals that affect the industry’s role in
the environment and its ability to cope with
regulations. Understanding the relationships
within the beef industry may aIlow researchers44 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
to fine-tune analyses of environmental issues
in this sector.
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